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Abstract  
We estimate the effect of the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax on household mobility 
using micro data. Exploiting a discontinuity in the tax schedule as a quasi-
experimental setting, we isolate the impact of the stamp duty from other 
determinants of mobility. We compare homeowners with self-assessed house 
values on either sides of a cut-off value where the tax rate increases from 1 to 3 
percent and find that a higher stamp duty strongly negatively affects their 
propensity to move. The 2 percentage-point increase in the stamp duty reduces 
the annual rate of mobility by between 2 and 3 percentage-points or about 30 
percent. This adverse effect is confined to short-distance and non-job related 
moves, suggesting a distortion in the housing rather than the labour market. As a 
cross-validation check, we also analyse the distribution of actual transaction 
prices and find that the tax rate increase reduces the volume of sales by roughly 
30 percent. 
Key words: Stamp duty, housing transfer taxes, transaction costs, 
homeownership, household mobility 
JEL classification numbers: D23, H21, H27, J61, R21, R31, R38 
 
  
Tiivistelmä  
Tutkimuksessa estimoidaan Iso-Britannian asuntojen varainsiirtoveron vaikutus 
kotitalouksien muuttoalttiuteen. Veroasteikon epäjatkuvuus mahdollistaa varain-
siirtoveron vaikutuksen erottamisen muista muuttoalttiuteen vaikuttavista teki-
jöistä. Kun asunnon hinta ylittää tietyn rajan, veroaste nousee 1 prosentista 3 
prosenttiin. Tutkimuksessa vertaillaan toisiinsa kotitalouksia, jotka ovat oman 
arvionsa mukaan rajan eri puolilla. Tulosten mukaan 2 prosenttiyksikön nousu 
varainsiirtoverossa vähentää muuttoalttiutta 2–3 prosenttiyksiköllä tai 30 prosen-
tilla. Tämä vaikutus rajoittuu lyhyen matkan muuttoihin, jotka liittyvät yleensä 
asuntokulutuksen sopeuttamiseen. Varainsiirtovero siis vääristää merkittävästi 
asuntomarkkinoiden toimintaa mutta sen vaikutukset työmarkkinoilla ovat vähäi-
set. Kotitaloudet asuvat varainsiirtoveron takia useammin tilanteeseensa sopimat-
tomissa asunnoissa. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan myös asuntohintojen jakaumaa 
ja havaitaan, että varainsiirtoveroprosentin hyppäys 2 prosentilla vähentää myös 
asuntokauppoja noin 30 prosentilla. Tämä tulos tuo lisävahvistusta varainsiirto-
veron haitallisesta vaikutuksesta asuntomarkkinoilla. 
Asiasanat: leimavero, asuntojen varainsiirtovero, muuttokustannukset, 
omistusasuminen, muuttoliike 
JEL-luokittelu: D23, H21, H27, J61, R21, R31, R38 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction 1 
2. The UK stamp duty system and theoretical considerations 5 
3. Empirical analysis 12 
3.1.Impact on household mobility 12 
3.1.1 BHPS data 12 
3.1.2 Empirical specification 15 
3.1.3 Results 17 
3.2 Impact on transaction volume 22 
3.2.1 Land Registry data 22 
3.2.2 Empirical specification 22 
3.2.3 Results 23 
4. Conclusions 25 
References 27 
Tables 29 
Appendix Tables 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Most developed countries impose a tax – often labelled ‘stamp duty’ – on 
housing transactions. The stamp duty increases the transaction costs associated 
with the sale of a property and therefore increases the costs of moving for 
homeowners. This cost increase can be expected to negatively affect the 
propensity to move. Thus, the stamp duty is prone to have adverse effects on 
housing- and labour markets. Households may not live in the type of dwelling 
and the location that most closely match their preferences. Similarly, individuals 
may be less willing to accept new jobs that are not within commuting distance or 
they may decide to hold on to a current job that is a less good match than another 
available job further away. Given these potential adverse effects caused by 
mismatch in housing- and labour markets, the question of whether, and to what 
extent, the stamp duty reduces housing- and job-related household mobility is 
highly policy relevant.  
The UK stamp duty – since 2003 termed Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) but 
commonly referred to as ‘stamp duty’ – has long been criticized by economists as 
being inefficient. The Mirrlees Review (2011) highlights the fact that the British 
stamp duty system “creates a disincentive for people to move house” (p. 403) and 
the adverse consequences of this on the functioning of housing- and labour 
markets. To date, however, little is known about the magnitude of this 
disincentive effect on actual household mobility or the nature of the affected 
moves (short vs. long distance and housing- vs. job-related). The present study 
sheds light on these questions. 
The UK provides an ideal setting to explore the impact of housing transfer taxes 
on mobility decisions. This is partly because the stamp duty liability is quite 
substantial, at least for more expensive housing (the top rate is currently 7 
percent of the purchase price), and partly because the stamp duty liability jumps 
sharply at various cut-off values, providing various ‘discontinuities’ that can be 
exploited empirically. Our analysis focuses on a discontinuity where the stamp 
duty jumps particularly strongly. This discontinuity allows us to isolate the 
impact of the stamp duty from other determinants of mobility.  
In our core analysis we use data from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) and compare homeowners with self-assessed house values on either side 
of the cut-off, while controlling for flexible but smooth functions of house 
values. We find that the stamp duty has a significant negative effect on 
household mobility and that this effect is confined to short-distance moves and to 
moves that are housing- rather than job-related. Our core estimates indicate that 
the 2 percentage-point increase in the stamp duty reduces the annual rate of 
mobility by between 2 and 3 percentage points. This is a very substantive effect 
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given that in the UK about 5 percent of all owner-occupier households move 
each year. 
To further assess the validity and quantitative significance of the response of 
households to the stamp duty, we turn our attention to a different dataset from the 
Land Registry that consists of actual transaction prices. Analysing the 
distribution of transaction prices of all housing sales in England and Wales, we 
find additional evidence of a strong behavioural response. We document 
bunching of observed transaction prices at the cut-offs where the tax rate 
increases and, consistent with the results of our core analysis, we find that a 2 
percentage point increase in the tax rate decreases the volume of sales by roughly 
30 percent.      
Two strands of the economics literature motivate our analysis. Firstly, we draw 
on the literature that explores the effects of various housing market policies on 
residential mobility and the corresponding mismatch on housing markets. A 
policy that has received particular attention by economists is rent control. Munch 
and Svarer (2002), for example, demonstrate that rent control in Denmark 
severely reduces the tenancy mobility. Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) go one step 
further and argue that rent control, by hampering residential mobility, locks 
households into suboptimal dwellings, creating wasteful mismatch on the 
housing market (i.e., a mismatch between different kinds of dwellings and 
households with different housing needs). They document that in New York rent 
control indeed causes an economically meaningful fraction of apartments to be 
misallocated across demographic groups. 
Secondly, there is a long line of research starting from Oswald (1996) that 
explores whether high moving costs related to owner-occupied housing may have 
negative effects on owner-occupiers’ labour market outcomes. Oswald (1996) 
argues that homeownership, by reducing mobility, may increase unemployment 
and provides cross-country evidence consistent with this conjecture. Subsequent 
studies (e.g., van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006 and 2008; 
Battu et al., 2008) that use individual-level panel data and more rigorous 
estimating techniques, by and large, confirm Oswald’s conjecture that 
homeowners are less mobile. They rebut, however, the hypotheses that 
homeowners are more likely to become unemployed or have longer 
unemployment spells.1 Coulson and Fisher (2009) explore a number of 
                                              
1 Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find no evidence that homeowners change jobs less than tenants. 
They conclude that the housing decision is driven by job commitment (and not the reverse) and that 
homeowners are less vulnerable to unemployment. Munch et al. (2006) point out that homeowners may 
set lower reservation wages for accepting jobs in the local labour market. Hence, they are more likely 
than renters to find jobs locally. Munch et al. (2008) have argued, from a search theoretic perspective, 
that homeowners should have a lower transition rate into new non-local jobs and therefore should stay 
longer in their jobs. Battu et al. (2008) suggest that there are differential effects across tenure types and 
that it matters whether the starting point is employment or unemployment. Their findings imply that 
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theoretical mechanisms that may affect the link between homeownership on the 
one hand and mobility and labour market outcomes on the other hand. They point 
out that different theoretical models can have very different predictions about the 
labour market at both micro and aggregate level. Their findings suggest that 
homeowners are less likely to be unemployed but they also have lower wages 
than renters. At the aggregate level, higher regional homeownership rates are 
associated with a greater probability of individual worker unemployment and 
higher wages. Finally, Ferreira et al. (2010 and 2011) point out that there may be 
an asymmetry in the mobility response of homeowners depending on whether 
they are in negative equity. Whereas their findings indicate that homeowners in 
negative equity are indeed less likely to move, other empirical studies 
(Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011; Coulson and Grieco, 2012) reach the conclusion that 
homeowners who are under water are slightly more likely to move than 
homeowners with positive equity. 
The general lesson to be learned from these two strands of the literature is that 
policies that make households less mobile may harmfully affect the performance 
of housing and labour markets.  
Our study makes a contribution to these two strands of the literature by looking 
deeper into one of the mechanisms – barriers to mobility of owner-occupiers 
induced by housing transfer taxes – that may explain differences in mobility by 
tenure status.  
Housing transfer taxes are an important part of moving costs and they are the 
most important component directly determined by policy makers. Despite this, 
little is known about their effect on mobility. On the theoretical side, Nordvik 
(2001) analyzes the mobility effects of the stamp duty in a theoretical dynamic 
life-cycle model of housing demand. He finds that a 2.5 percent stamp duty 
decreases the number of moves by the model households over the life cycle from 
three to one, implying a dead-weight loss of the stamp duty in the region of 
between 17 and 34 percent of the tax revenue.  
On the empirical side, Dachis et al. (2012) utilize the introduction of real estate 
transfer taxes in Toronto to estimate their effect on the housing transaction 
volume and prices with a Differences-in-Differences approach comparing market 
outcomes across the boundary of the affected area.2 They find that a 1.1 percent 
real estate transfer tax led to a 15 percent decrease in transactions in the first 
eight months after the introduction of the tax.  
                                                                                                                                    
homeownership is a constraint for the employed and public renting is more of a constraint for the 
unemployed. 
2 See also Dachis (2012) for follow-up work using a longer data period. 
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Van Ommeren and van Leuvensteijn (2005) provide indirect evidence on the 
mobility effects of the stamp duty using individual panel data for the 
Netherlands. They estimate a competing risks hazard model of moving to renting 
or owning with house values as an explanatory variable and use a theoretical 
model to infer the effect of transaction costs. Their results suggest that a 1 
percentage-point increase in the value of transaction costs — as a percentage of 
the value of the residence — decreases residential mobility rates by at least 8 
percent.  
Discontinuities in transfer tax schedules have recently attracted increasing 
attention as a source of insight into how the tax affects market outcomes. Related 
to this paper, Best and Kleven (2013) utilize (i) the discontinuities in the UK 
schedule to study price responses and (ii) changes in the tax schedule over time 
to study the effect on the transaction volume. They find evidence of a strong 
negative price effect. In addition, they find that a temporary 1 percentage-point 
cut in the tax rate lead to a 20 percent increase in transactions. The bulk of this 
impact is explained by a long term reduction in sales rather than the timing of 
purchases. In a similar vein, Kopczuk and Munroe (2013) utilize the 
discontinuity in tax liability induced by the so called mansion tax in the US and 
find evidence that the incidence of this tax is on the seller. Davidoff and Leigh 
(2013) use data from Australia where the marginal tax rate rather than the 
average tax rate jumps at various cut-off prices. They use past local house prices 
and national house price inflation to construct an instrumental variable for the 
transfer tax rate. Their results indicate that a higher tax rate reduces turnover and 
that the incidence of the tax is on the seller. 
The contribution of our study to this existing literature is twofold. Firstly, we 
identify the long-term (equilibrium) effects of the stamp duty on actual 
household mobility. Secondly, we are able to distinguish between different types 
of moves. In particular, our analysis distinguishes between short- and long-
distance moves and between housing- and job-related moves. This paper is to our 
knowledge the first quasi-experimental study that directly evaluates the effect of 
a real estate transfer tax on actual household mobility. 
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2. The UK stamp duty system and theoretical 
considerations 
The stamp duty on real estate transactions was introduced in the UK during the 
1950s. We focus on the current system of stamp duty on residential real estate 
transactions.3 The stamp duty is paid by the buyer and is a percentage share of 
the purchase price of the house. The economic incidence, however, can be 
mainly expected to fall on the seller: In a setting with a uniform stamp duty for 
all properties and relatively inelastic supply, the stamp duty will be nearly fully 
(negatively) capitalised into house prices and the tax will be mainly borne by the 
seller.4   
The defining feature of the UK stamp duty system is a progressive schedule 
where the tax rate for the whole purchase price goes up at certain thresholds. 
Table 1 reports the tax schedule that applies during our sample period: Houses 
sold for up to £125,000 are exempt from stamp duty, but from £125,000 upwards 
the tax rate rises in a stepwise manner from 1 to 5 percent.5  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the purchase price and stamp duty 
liabilities. Our empirical analysis focuses on the second cut-off at £250,000 
where the tax rate increases from 1 to 3 percent. We do so for three reasons: (1) 
The cut-off is not affected by regional exemptions, (2) stamp duty payable 
increases significantly at the cut-off (from £2,500 to £7,500), and (3) our data is 
reasonably dense around the £250k cut-off. Significant variation in stamp duty 
liabilities and large sample size together make it possible to detect the effects of 
the stamp duty on mobility.  
We focus on the current stamp duty system – the Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT), 
which replaced the old system in 2003. The SDLT was designed to crack down 
on tax evasion. In the old system it was possible to evade taxes by selling 
“fixtures and fittings” separately at excessive prices. In the current system, the 
sale of fixtures and fittings is declared together with the property and the Land 
Registry compares purchase prices with typical prices paid in the area to detect 
evasion. 
 
 
                                              
3 The stamp duty also applies to other types of property transactions. 
4 Dachis et al. (2012) document roughly full capitalization of housing transaction taxes in the Toronto 
area and Davidoff and Leigh (2013) find evidence of strong capitalization in Australia. Hilber et al. 
(2011) find roughly full capitalisation of central government grants in England, implying that the stamp 
duty – another fiscal instrument – may also be roughly fully capitalised. 
5 A new higher “mansion” tax rate of 7 percent (or 15 percent for corporate bodies) was introduced for 
properties over £2 million on 22 March 2012. 
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FIGURE 1 
Purchase price and stamp duty 
 
 
The stamp duty drives a wedge between the price obtained by the seller and the 
price paid by the buyer and basic economic intuition suggests that these 
transaction costs will result in fewer housing transactions. Moreover, to the 
extent that households who consider moving need the sales proceeds for their 
next down-payment or do not want to become a landlord and rent out their 
existing home, we would expect that the stamp duty also reduces household 
mobility.6  
When households make their mobility decisions they take into account the 
expected benefits of moving as well as the expected costs. The expected benefits 
will depend on the underlying motive for the move. Moves induced by 
employment related shocks can be expected to have a greater variance in 
expected benefits than moves induced by incremental housing-related motives. 
On the cost side, one cost component households will consider are the expected 
transaction costs induced by the stamp duty and these in turn depend on the 
expected sales price upon moving (i.e., the self-assessed house value). 
It is, however, not immediately clear how the owner’s perceived house value and 
tax induced moving costs are related in the British stepwise tax schedule. We 
therefore use simple theoretical reasoning to analyse the likely effect of the stamp 
                                              
6 In addition to the effect on the mobility of homeowners, the stamp duty may also affect the propensity 
that households choose to become homeowners (and, possibly, the aggregate housing consumption over 
the life cycle). Households (especially those with a short expected duration) can be expected to become 
renters because the moving costs are high. The effect of the stamp duty on tenure choice is a question that 
should be explored in future work. 
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duty schedule on incentives to move for households with different self-assessed 
house values.  
In our empirical analysis we essentially compare households reporting house 
values above the 250k cut-off with households with self-reported values below 
the cut-off. Specifically, we assume that dwellings produce a homogenous flow 
of housing services H. We consider a competitive housing market (for simplicity 
without search) where the buyers’ willingness to pay for one unit of H is fixed 
and denoted by P. For illustrative purposes, let P=1. The purchase price of the 
dwelling is denoted by V and the stamp duty rate by t. In this setting, the stamp 
duty is capitalized into the purchase price V, and, hence, V is given by V = PH/(1 
+ t) = H/(1 + t). We assume that, other things equal, a household’s propensity to 
move depends negatively on the price per unit of housing services they receive 
upon sale V/H = 1/(1 + t).  
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between housing services H provided by the 
dwelling (horizontal axis), price of the whole dwelling V (left vertical axis) and 
the seller’s price per unit of housing services V/H (right vertical axis) in a UK 
type stepwise tax schedule with t = 0.01 up to V=250k and t = 0.03 for V>250k.  
With this tax schedule, a house with H just above the cut-off will sell for £250k 
because, due to the higher stamp duty, charging slightly above £250k would 
imply that the buyer is better off buying a house with slightly lower H and price 
£250k. As shown by the solid line, a seller will only be able to charge above 
£250k if the value of the services above the cut-off exceeds the additional stamp 
duty liabilities (£5,000).   
FIGURE 2 
Housing services, purchase price and price per unit for the seller   
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Now consider the relationship between the self-assessed house value V and the 
price per unit of H obtained by the seller. As a starting point, we assume that 
households think they know with certainty (i) the value of their house and (ii) 
that the stamp duty is fully negatively capitalized into the sales price. In this 
simplified case, sellers with self-assessed house value (i.e., expected sales price) 
below £250k face a ‘market price’ (V/H) of £0.99 per unit of H and households 
reporting above £250k face a ‘market price’ of £0.97. Households reporting 
exactly £250k include those who would sell for £250k even in the absence of the 
tax rate notch (i.e., the jump from 1 to 3 percent) and those who would sell for 
£250k < V ≤ £255k in the absence of the notch but are unable to do so because of 
the notch. The latter group now receives £0.97≤ V/H < £0.99. We argue that the 
decrease in the price per unit of housing services, V/H, at the cut-off reduces the 
utility of moving compared with the utility of staying. Hence, we expect to see a 
drop in household mobility, when the perceived value of the house exceeds 
£250k.  
In the absence of uncertainty, V/H drops sharply at £250k. This is illustrated by 
the solid line in Figure 3. In practice, however, households are likely to be 
uncertain about the true sales price of their house. We would expect that 
uncertainty will smooth out the relationship between the self-assessed price and 
V/H, as illustrated by the dashed line. Moreover, respondents may or may not 
include the amount charged for fixture and fittings and possible illegal side 
payments in their house value estimates. If avoidance components are included in 
the self-assessed value, households reporting a house value slightly above £250k 
may in fact face a V/H above £0.97, which would further smooth out the 
downward shift in V/H at the £250k cut-off, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Uncertainty implies that, strictly speaking, there is no sharp discontinuity in the 
V/H at the £250k cut-off. However, at the scale we use in the empirical analysis, 
arguably, the discontinuity is sharp enough for regression discontinuity type 
empirical analysis to be informative of the causal effect of the stamp duty 
increase at the cut-off. Due to data limitations, and the fact that household 
mobility is difficult to model, we have to use data relatively far from the cut-off 
to get reasonably precise estimates. In our base specification, we use a sample 
where self-assessed house values vary between £175k and £325k (a 30 percent 
band around the £250k cut-off).  
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FIGURE 3 
Seller’s self-assessed house value and price per unit of housing services  
 
 
Our theoretical analysis suggests that we should observe a pile-up in the 
transaction price distribution at £250k because houses that would sell for up to 
£255k absent of the tax rate notch will sell for £250k. This is indeed what is seen 
in Figure 4, which illustrates the distribution of actual transaction prices in the 
UK in 2006 from a data set obtained from the Land Registry. Our simplified 
theoretical analysis also implies that the price distribution right of the cut-off 
should move left and the distribution should continue smoothly after the cut-off. 
However, Figure 4 shows a dip in the distribution immediately right of the cut-
off. Very few properties sell at £251k – £255k. The possibility to avoid taxes by 
selling fixtures and fittings separately at excessive prices is a possible 
explanation for this dip. Even though the SDLT system introduced in 2003 made 
such tax avoidance harder, it is likely that close to the cut-off people are more 
prone to engage in tax avoidance, even by unlawful means, because just above 
the cut-off, the expected benefits of trying to bring down the declared purchase 
price may exceed the cost associated with the risk of getting caught.7 
 
                                              
7 Our theoretical considerations abstract from the fact that sellers may not only care about the sales price 
but also about the property’s expected time on the market, which signifies an opportunity cost to them. 
Properties that offer housing services close to H=257,500 but can only be sold for £250k can be expected 
to have a shorter time on the market than properties that offer housing services H only slightly above 
252,500 and that can also be sold for £250k. This effect may thus in principle further reduce the sharpness 
of the discontinuity in V/H at the £250k cut-off. During our sample period, however, the median time on 
the market was quite short (see: http://www.hometrack.co.uk/our-insight/monthly-national-house-price-
survey/time -to-sell-over-three-months-across-a-third-of-the-country; last accessed on 29/5/2012). 
Moreover, property sales in the UK are time-consuming mainly due to a complicated legal procedure that 
takes roughly 12 weeks irrespective of the ‘attractiveness’ of the asking price (see e.g., 
http://www.home.co.uk/guides/buying/; last accessed on 29/5/2012). Hence, the discontinuity in V/H at 
the cut-off can be expected to persist even when endogenous time on the market is taken into account. 
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FIGURE 4 
Housing transaction prices in the UK in 2006   
 
 
The above theoretical considerations yield a number of empirically testable 
predictions. Our main prediction (Prediction 1) follows directly from the above 
considerations: At the house value cut-off of £250k, as a consequence of the 
stamp duty tax notch, household mobility should decrease.  
We would expect that the magnitude of this adverse effect depends on household 
specific circumstances. Homeowners who face gradual changes in their life-cycle 
circumstances, which move them away incrementally from their optimal 
locations and housing consumptions, may be more strongly discouraged from 
moving, as a consequence of the stamp duty, than homeowners who face more 
momentous – typically employment related – mobility shocks. Generally, we 
would expect that the variance of the expected benefit associated with a longer 
distance or employment related move is greater than the variance of the expected 
benefit associated with a shorter distance or housing related move. The 
corresponding empirical predictions are that at the house value cut-off of £250k, 
as a consequence of the stamp duty tax notch, the adverse effect on household 
mobility should be greater for shorter-distance moves than for longer-distance 
moves (Prediction 2) and for housing related as opposed to job related moves 
(Prediction 3). The theoretical argument for this prediction is illustrated in 
Figure 5. Households relocate when the benefits (B) exceed the costs (C) of 
moving. The curve shows the density function of the benefits of moving. An 
increase in the stamp duty rate from 1 to 3 percent reduces the mobility by the 
area between C(t=1%) and C(t=3%). This area is bigger in panel B than in panel 
A because the benefits associated with housing related moves have a shorter tail 
than job related moves. 
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FIGURE 5 
Job versus housing related moves   
 
 
Finally, we would expect that an increase in transaction costs results in an overall 
reduction in observed sales right of the cut-off (Prediction 4).8 In the empirical 
analysis that follows we turn to the data to test Predictions 1 to 4. 
                                              
8 Consistent with this theoretical conjecture, in Figure 4 the distribution right of the cut-off seems 
depressed even further away from the apparent bunching region, suggesting that the tax reduces the 
volume of sales. 
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3. Empirical analysis 
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. In Section 3.1 we use household 
level data from the BHPS to analyse the effect of the tax on overall household 
mobility and on different types of moves (Predictions 1 to 3). In Section 3.2 we 
then turn to housing transaction data from the Land Registry to estimate the 
effect of the stamp duty on the volume of transactions (Prediction 4).  
3.1. Impact on household mobility  
3.1.1 BHPS data 
The data used in this section is derived from the BHPS. The BHPS follows 
roughly 10,000 households over time. The survey began in 1991 and the last year 
available is 2008.9 The surveys for each wave are conducted between September 
and March. We define our ‘year’ variable as the year when data collection 
started.  
In addition to a rich set of household characteristics, the dataset includes the 
owner-occupiers’ assessments of the value of their homes and information on 
whether the household moved in the subsequent year, making it an ideal dataset 
to study the impact of the stamp duty on household mobility. The exact question 
on which the self-assessed house value is based is: “About how much would you 
expect to get for your home if you sold it today?” If the household gives a range, 
the interviewer will report the lowest figure in that range. 
We limit the sample to the post 2002 period when the SDLT system with stricter 
control on tax avoidance came into effect. In the estimations, we further limit the 
sample to owner-occupiers with self-assessed house values within 20 to 40 
percent bands around the £250k cut-off where the stamp duty tax rate jumps from 
1 to 3 percent. A further limitation is that the mobility status of the last wave 
(2008) is not known. Thus, the estimation sample consists of data from 2003 to 
2007. Finally, we are concerned that recent movers may bias our results. Because 
many houses sell at and just below £250k, recent movers are disproportionately 
represented just below the cut-off. To the extent that the recent mover status 
affects mobility, this may bias our estimates. Moreover, recent movers may be 
problematic for our research design in the sense that, when households move, 
they can precisely choose the value of their house. Their ability to “precisely 
manipulate” the assignment variable can invalidate the Regression Discontinuity 
(RD) design. Due to these issues, we exclude households that moved into their 
current dwelling between year t-1 and t.  
                                              
9 The BHPS was subsequently replaced by the Understanding Society survey and there was a break in the 
panel. 
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Figure 6 shows the distribution of self-assessed house values. Overall, people 
tend to report round values divisible by £50k. There is a clear spike at £250k, but 
this spike does not stand out from the other round values. The spike is clearly 
much more pronounced in the transaction price distribution in Figure 4. The fact 
that there is no abnormal pile-up at the cut-off supports the validity of the RD 
design. 
FIGURE 6 
Distribution of self-assessed house values (excluding recent movers) 
 
 
Treatment variable 
Our treatment variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the self-assessed 
house value of household i in year t-1 exceeds £250k, Treatit-1 = D(House valueit-
1 > 250k). Based on the discussion in Section 2, we argue that the likelihood of 
being affected by the 3 percent tax rate rather than the 1 percent rate increases 
drastically at, or in the vicinity of, this point. The self-assessed value may not be 
an accurate measure of the actual value when a house is sold. However, the self-
assessed value is arguably more relevant for our purposes as households’ 
expectations regarding stamp duty payable upon sale are likely based on the self-
assessed house value.  
Outcome variable 
Our outcome variable measures actual moves between the interview date and the 
subsequent interview. The variable Move gets the value one if the BHPS records 
classify the household as a mover household in t. We lose some observations due 
to attrition from the panel between t-1 and t but we were able to recover the value 
of the moving indicator for some non-respondent households by utilizing 
information in the sample record files of the BHPS. In addition to the overall 
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mobility, we study different types of mobility separately by using information on 
the distance of move and main reasons of moving. 
We argue that a direct measure of household mobility is preferable to measures 
of housing transactions, used in previous studies, when the interest is on the 
potential adverse impact of the stamp duty on the functioning of housing- and 
labour markets. As already noted in the introduction, the effect of the stamp duty 
on transactions may differ from the effect on mobility for two reasons: (i) some 
housing transactions are carried out by investors rather than owner-occupiers, 
and (ii) some mover households can circumvent the stamp duty by renting out 
their previous house rather than selling it. In the latter case, the stamp duty leads 
to a distortion in a household’s investment portfolio but may affect mobility to a 
lesser extent. In our data about 20 percent of owner-occupiers who moved appear 
to have rented out their previous unit.10  
Control variables  
Exploring the data suggests that households that report round house values 
divisible by £50k (£100k, £150k etc.) have a lower propensity to move. One 
might be concerned that households intending to stay do not follow the market as 
closely and give rough rounded estimates of the value of their house. The round 
value effect might bias our estimates if disproportionately many round values are 
in the treatment or the control group. To address this issue, we include a dummy 
variable for round house values divisible by £50k in the model as a control 
variable. In addition, we control for year specific effects that affect the whole 
economy by including year dummies. 
Summary statistics 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis 
for the largest regression sample (40 percent band around the cut-off). The 
average house value in the sample is £220,000 and 4.7 percent of households 
moved within a year. To analyse whether different types of moves are 
differentially affected, we divide moves into three categories based on the 
distance of move: less than 10km, 10–30km and over 30km. In addition, we use 
information about the main reason of moving given by the respondents. We 
divide these reasons into three categories: ‘housing and area related’, 
‘employment related’ and ‘other or unknown’ (includes missing values). Housing 
related reasons and other or unknown reasons are the most common categories. 
Moves motivated mainly by job related reasons seem to be rare. This may partly 
reflect how the survey question is formulated. Employment motives may still be 
important even if they are not the main reason of move. Moving distance and 
                                              
10 Housing transactions are not recorded directly in our data. The estimate was calculated by checking 
whether owner-occupiers who had no additional property when they moved have an additional property 
two years later.  
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main reason of move being employment related are strongly positively correlated 
and we think that by analysing the distance of move we can gain additional 
insight into whether the stamp duty hinders relocation of the workforce. Only one 
percent of short distance moves (less than 10km) but about 13 percent of moves 
beyond 30km are mainly job related. Similarly, 56 percent of short distance 
moves but only 18 percent of long distance moves are mainly housing related.  
3.1.2 Empirical specification 
We use regression analysis to estimate the impact of an increase in the stamp 
duty rate on the propensity to move of owner-occupier households. The 
estimation of the effect of the stamp duty is challenging because stamp duty 
liabilities are likely to be correlated with other factors that affect mobility. 
However, the fact that the stamp duty rate for the whole property jumps at certain 
cut-off points can be used to identify the impact of the stamp duty. More 
specifically, we use the RD method discussed in Lee and Lemieux (2010). The 
idea is to compare mobility rates below the £250k cut-off point, where the stamp 
duty amount increases sharply, with the moving probability of households above 
the cut-off point. We estimate a regression model of a mobility dummy on a 
dummy for being above the cut-off point and include a flexible but smooth 
function of house values in the set of control variables. The house value variables 
pick up the impact of all determinants of mobility correlated with house values, 
apart from the stamp duty. Hence, we will obtain a reliable estimate of the effect 
of the stamp duty on mobility clean from confounding factors that might 
otherwise bias our estimates. 
We estimate a reduced form model evaluating the mobility effect of being above 
the £250k threshold compared with being below the cut-off. We estimate by OLS 
the following model: 
Moveit = βt+ β1Treatit-1+ f(House Valueit-1)+ uit ,  (1) 
where the dependent variable Moveit is the mobility indicator that gets the value 
one if household i moved between t – 1 and t. The treatment variable takes the 
value one if the household’s self-assessed house value exceeds £250k. The 
function f(House Valueit-1) is a 1st – 4th order polynomial of self-assessed house 
values. To facilitate comparability of the treatment and control groups, we limit 
the data to 20, 30 or 40 percent bands around the cut-off. 
Our empirical model can be interpreted as a reduced form of a fuzzy RD design. 
Arguably, the discontinuity we exploit is likely to be fuzzy because we can’t be 
sure whether all households reporting house values above the limit are affected 
by the 3 percent tax rate. Standard fuzzy RD analysis uses a discontinuity in the 
likelihood of obtaining the treatment as an instrument for the actual treatment 
status in a Two-Stage-Least-Squares regression. This approach is not feasible 
with the BHPS data because there is no way to identify the treated households 
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with certainty. We argue that the reduced form of the fuzzy RD likely produces 
downward biased estimates of the actual treatment effect, because the treatment 
group as defined in (1) likely measures actual treatment status with error, which 
leads to attenuation bias towards zero. 
The identifying assumption of the model is that other determinants of mobility 
develop smoothly with respect to house values and are therefore captured by the f 
function. The ability of households to precisely manipulate whether they are to 
the right or to the left of the cut-off would invalidate the design. Manipulation of 
the self-assessed value is naturally possible but households do not have 
incentives to misreport in the BHPS survey. Manipulation of the actual value of 
the house may be possible too by, for example, neglecting renovation. However, 
local demand and supply conditions are the main drivers of house prices and 
therefore precise manipulation is impossible. 
If all households respond similarly to the stamp duty, our results for the £250k 
cut-off can be generalized to apply for the whole population in the UK and 
possibly tell us something about the effects of similar taxes in other countries as 
well. With heterogeneous responses, the results may apply to a smaller sub-
population. Drawing on Lee and Lemieux (2010), our estimates can be 
interpreted as a weighted average of treatment effects of the British owner-
occupier households in the BHPS data. The weight of each household is the 
probability that their self-assessed house value falls within the band around the 
cut-off used in each specification we estimate.  
The panel property of the data and the lumpiness of the distribution of self-
assessed house values have potential implications for statistical inference. Firstly, 
since the households in our sample are observed in multiple years, we have to 
account for within household correlation of the error terms. Hence, we cluster the 
error terms at the household level in our base specification. Another potential 
issue regarding statistical inference was pointed out by Lee and Card (2008), who 
discuss RD analysis with a discrete assignment variable. They argue that 
specification errors in the fitted regression line imply that at each discrete value 
there is an error component positively correlated within observations at that 
particular point, which means that standard errors are downward biased. They 
show that clustering standard errors by the values of the discrete assignment 
variable solves the problem. In principle, the self-assessed house value is a 
continuous variable and in the BHPS data there are observations at 147 different 
self-reported values within the broadest house value band we use (£150k – 
£350k). However, 97.7 percent of the observations are concentrated at values 
divisible by £5k. We construct a new house value variable by rounding house 
values up to the closest value divisible by £5k and use it as an alternative 
assignment variable in a robustness check where we cluster standard errors at the 
house value group level in addition to the household level. Clustering at all of the 
147 discrete values is not feasible because of very few observations at several 
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non-round values. Clustering at the house value group level may be problematic 
with the samples using the 20 percent and 30 percent bands around the £250k 
cut-off because the number of clusters is limited. With the 40 percent band, 
however, the number of house value clusters is reasonably large (40 clusters). 
This robustness check indicates to what extent standard errors clustered only at 
the household level are likely to be downward biased. 
3.1.3 Results 
We start with a descriptive analysis of mobility, in which we do not restrict the 
functional form of the relationship between the house value and mobility. Figure 
7 illustrates predicted mobility for £5k wide house value groups from a 
regression of the mobility indicator on house value group dummies. The line in 
Figure 7 is highly volatile, but it seems to suggest that there is a downward shift 
in the moving probability when the self-assessed house value exceeds £250k. 
Next, we test for the statistical significance of this downward shift and attempt to 
quantify it with our RD type method.  
 
FIGURE 7 
Mobility and self-assessed house values 
 
Notes: Predicted mobility from a regression of a move dummy on house value 
group dummies. Solid line indicates house values with 1 percent stamp duty 
rate and dashed line indicates house values with 3 percent stamp duty rate. 
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and 40 percent bands around the £250k cut-off. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) is shown in italics to assist specification selection.  
In the first column, the coefficient on the treatment indicator is close to zero and 
insignificant, but becomes negative and significant when the house value controls 
are added. With the +/-20 percent band, the estimates vary from -0.02 and 
insignificant to -0.055 and significant. Using a wider band makes the estimates 
more stable and decreases the standard errors. With the 30 percent band, the 
estimate is -0.025 and highly significant in the second column and stays virtually 
unchanged in the 3rd column. In the fourth column the coefficient is 0.22 and 
significant at the 5 percent level. We take this specification with the 30 percent 
band and the 3rd order polynomial of house values as our preferred specification. 
The band is wide enough for reasonably precise estimation and the 3rd order 
polynomial is chosen because adding further polynomials increases the AIC 
score. Taken at face value, the point estimate of our preferred specification 
implies that the 2 percentage-point increase in the stamp duty rate reduces the 
propensity to move by about 2.2 percentage-points in absolute terms or by 31 
percent in relative terms.11 In row 3, using a 40 percent band around the cut-off, 
the coefficient is insignificant with the 1st order polynomial but becomes 
significant with the 2nd order polynomial or with higher order polynomials.  
Our various point estimates vary around our preferred estimate with the attached 
standard errors also varying around the standard error of the preferred estimate. 
Overall, our results provide strong supporting evidence that an increase in the 
stamp duty has a significant negative effect on household mobility.  
Distance and type of moves 
In Table 4, we explore the proposition that an increase in the stamp duty tax rate 
more strongly adversely affects short distance moves (Prediction 2). We divide 
moves into three groups based on the straight line distance of move: less than 10 
kilometers, 10–30 kilometers, and over 30 kilometers. The shares of these groups 
in our sample are 56 percent, 17 percent and 27 percent. We use indicators for 
these categories as outcome variables in model (1). The results imply that the 
overall effect found in Table 3 is solely driven by short-distance mobility (less 
than 10km). Medium- and longer-distance mobility appear to be unaffected by 
the stamp duty. A likely explanation for this finding is that short-distance 
mobility is often related to adjustments of housing consumption. A 2 percentage 
point increase in the stamp duty may outweigh the benefits of typical housing 
consumption adjustments, such as buying one room more or less, but it may not 
outweigh the benefits associated with longer distance moves. The latter are 
                                              
11 The relative decrease in propensity to move was calculated by comparing the treatment effect estimate 
(2.2 percentage points) in our preferred model specification to the predicted moving propensity (7 
percentage points) in the treatment group absent of the treatment. The relative reduction in mobility is 
2.2/7 = 31 percent. 
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typically related to other important decisions, such as changes in employment or 
family status.12  
In Table 5, we test the proposition that the stamp duty has a stronger impact on 
housing related than on employment related household mobility (Prediction 3). 
We use information on the primary reason of moving to divide moves into three 
groups: 1) Job related mobility, 2) housing and area related mobility, and 3) 
reason of move ‘other or unknown’. The share of moves mainly motivated by job 
related reasons is only about 5 percent, which makes it difficult to identify a 
separate effect on job motivated moves. This issue notwithstanding, the results in 
Table 5 are in line with our interpretation of the distance-of-move results in 
Table 4. Coefficients for housing and area motivated moves are always negative 
and highly statistically significant in three of the six specifications while the 
coefficients for job related moves are close to zero and insignificant. This finding 
is consistent with a setting where the benefit derived from a job-related move has 
a low mean but a high variance. In such a setting we should observe few job-
related moves and very few of them should be affected by the stamp duty. The 
results are less clear-cut for mobility for ‘other and unknown’ reasons. The 
negative and sometimes significant coefficients are indicative that part of the 
negative mobility effect of the stamp duty may be attributable to a reduction in 
this kind of moves. 
Validity tests and robustness checks 
A standard way of testing the validity of the RD design is to check if 
predetermined characteristics of households change significantly at the cut-off. If 
the flexible but smooth function of the assignment variable (self-assessed house 
values in our case) adequately captures other relevant factors, we should not 
observe changes in background characteristics of households at the cut-off. 
Specifically, we are concerned that households with a high underlying propensity 
to move and houses worth slightly above £250k (in the absence of the tax notch) 
may be better informed about the stamp duty and may therefore be more likely to 
report precisely £250k rather than slightly above £250k. To test this, we estimate 
model (1) using several observed determinants of mobility as the dependent 
variable. The variables used are: the age of the household head, dummy for kids, 
household income and two indicators of education (GCE A-levels or higher and 
bachelor degree or higher) as the dependent variable. If the sorting story was true 
we would expect to find significant coefficients in the balancing tests. The 
balancing tests for education are particularly important because in addition to 
being related with mobility, education may also be related with how well the 
household knows the stamp duty system. 
                                              
12 Consistent with this conjecture, Buck (2000) finds that job-related moves in the UK tend to be over 
longer distances (across rather than within Local Authority Districts). 
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Table 6 shows the results of the balancing tests with a 3rd order polynomial of 
house values in Panel A and 4th order polynomial in Panel B. Panel A, indicates 
that income, the likelihood of having children and education are not correlated 
with the treatment variable but, in the specification with the 40 percent band, age 
is statistically significantly higher in the treatment group. However, when we add 
the 4th order term of house values in Panel B, the coefficient becomes 
insignificant even with the 40 percent band.  
In order to test whether our results might be driven by age and other confounding 
factors correlated with the treatment indicator we include age, dummy for kids, 
log of household income, dummy for GCE A-levels or higher, dummy for 
bachelor degree or higher and region dummies (19 regions) as control variables 
in model (1). Table 7 shows the results. The coefficients on age of household 
head, dummy for kids and log of household income are negative and significant 
and the dummy for bachelor degree is positive and significant (not shown in the 
tables). The coefficients on the treatment indicator are very similar to the 
specifications without the additional controls in Table 3, which increases our 
confidence in the finding that the stamp duty decreases mobility. The robustness 
of the results to observed determinants of mobility suggests that unobserved 
omitted variables are unlikely to bias our estimates significantly. 
We carried out a number of additional robustness checks, the results of which we 
report in various Appendix Tables. To begin with, as a further test for whether 
households with a high underlying propensity to move sort into the self-assessed 
house value of £250k, we re-estimated Table 3 dropping all households that self-
report exactly £250k. The results reported in Appendix Table A1 are similar 
despite losing many observations. Our results survive even when we limit the 
sample to households who say they are willing to move. In this subsample, 
sorting on unobserved propensity to move should not be a problem. The results 
are shown in Appendix Table A2. 
In our base specification, we fit the same polynomial over the whole range of 
house values and only allow the intercept to change at the cut-off. Restricting the 
polynomials to be the same on both sides of the cut-off can be considered 
intuitively unappealing, because it implies that we use data on the right of the 
cut-off to estimate the function on the left, and vice versa. We therefore estimate 
a more flexible specification in which we allow the slope of the regression line to 
differ by treatment status. That is, we estimate the coefficients on the nth order 
polynomials of house values separately for the sample below and above the cut-
off. We report results with 1st and 2nd order polynomials of house values, so that 
the maximum number of parameters used is the same as in our base specification. 
The results are reported in Appendix Table A3. Again, all estimates are negative 
and some of them are statistically significant. As expected, the standard errors go 
up in some specifications, especially with the 2nd order polynomial. 
 21 
 
Another concern is that our results might be driven by some irregularities related 
to the reporting of house values around round numbers. In order to test this 
possibility, we run placebo tests with artificial cut-offs set at £200k, £225k, 
£275k and £300k. We focus on our core specifications that use a 30 percent band 
around the cut-off and 3rd and 4th order polynomials of house values. The results 
are shown in Appendix Table A4. One of the eight placebo tests gives a positive 
and significant coefficient at the 10 percent-level, the rest are small and 
insignificant. The fact that our method does not give significant negative 
coefficients at artificial cut-offs increases our confidence in the finding that the 
decrease in mobility at £250k is indeed caused by the 2 percentage-point increase 
in the stamp duty at the cut-off.  
Finally, standard errors in Table 3 are clustered at the household level to make 
them robust for correlation in the error term within household. As discussed in 
Section 3.1.2., the error terms may, in addition, be correlated within different 
self-assessed house values. In Appendix Table A5 we show the results with the 
40 percent band using £5k wide house value groups as the assignment variable 
and two-way clustering. The coefficients on the treatment indicator in Appendix 
Table A5 are almost identical to those in Table 3. A comparison of standard 
errors in Appendix Table A5 with the standard errors in Table 3 (40 percent 
band) suggests that the one-way clustered standard errors in Table 3 are only 
slightly downward biased. Two-way clustering increases standard errors by 
around 0.002 depending on the specification – the significance levels do not 
change. 
The analysis thus far has focused on the adverse impact of the stamp duty on 
household-specific mobility decisions by assessing self-assessed house values 
around a tax rate cut-off and has revealed that the adverse effect may be mainly 
confined to short distance and housing related moves.  
In the analysis that follows, as a cross-validation check, we focus instead on the 
distribution of observed transaction prices. In doing so we draw on a recent 
literature on ‘bunching’ (e.g., Saez, 2010; Slemrod, 2010; Seim, 2012; Kleven 
and Waseem, 2013; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2013; Best and Kleven, 2013) and use 
actual housing transaction price data from the Land Registry to provide estimates 
of the aggregate effect of the stamp duty on the volume of housing transactions.  
While this additional analysis does not allow us to identify the impact of the 
stamp duty on actual household mobility and for different types of moves, it has 
a number of other virtues. Firstly, our estimates of the effect of the stamp duty on 
household mobility vary significantly across specifications and are not always 
precisely estimated. In contrast, the estimates that are based on the Land Registry 
data arguably provide a rather precise estimate of the overall effect of the stamp 
duty on the sales volume. This is because the Land Registry dataset covers all 
housing transactions in England and Wales and therefore yields a much larger 
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sample size. Secondly, the fact that we use an alternative dataset (that consists of 
actual transaction prices rather than self-assessed house values) and an alternative 
methodological approach allows us to further assess the validity and quantitative 
significance of our core finding – the behavioural response of households to the 
stamp duty. Thirdly, whereas self-assessed house values do not allow us to 
identify the treated households with certainty, actual transaction prices provide 
concise information on the treatment. Lastly, as discussed above, a move does 
not necessarily equate a housing transaction and vice versa. Hence, estimating 
the impact of the stamp duty on the transaction volume provides additional 
insights.  
3.2 Impact on transaction volume 
3.2.1 Land Registry data 
The housing transactions data for our aggregate analysis comes from the British 
Land Registry, which records the price and some minimal information on the 
property of each housing transaction in England and Wales. For our analysis we 
use data for England for the years 2003 to 2008. We limit the sample to 
transactions between £150k and £350k (40 percent band around the cut-off value 
of £250k), which leaves us roughly 2.8 million transactions. 
3.2.2 Empirical specification 
The bunching of transaction prices at the cut-off, illustrated in Figure 4, indicates 
that there is a behavioural response to the tax rate notch. As discussed in Section 
2, one potential explanation for bunching at £250k and the following hollow 
region with very few sales is capitalization of the tax into the price and by tax 
avoidance with convex costs. Our focus is on the adverse impact of the tax rate 
increase on the volume of sales which shows up as missing mass further away 
from the hollow region right of the cut-off. In order to estimate the reduction in 
the sales volume due to the tax rate increase, we fit a polynomial to the price 
distribution and include a dummy for transactions above £250k, as well as 
controls for values close to the cut-off and natural bunching at round values. We 
aggregate the distribution of transactions to £5,000 wide bins to smooth it. We 
include dummies for bins close to the cut-off to eliminate the impact of the local 
bunching of sales to the treatment effect estimate. The model can be written as 
follows: 
 ln(Njt) = βt+ β1Treatjt+ ft(Pricejt)+ λ1 Bin240jt + … + λ6 Bin265jt  
+ δ1Round50jt + δ2AfterRound50 jt + ujt .  (2)    
 
The dependent variable is the log of transactions in bin j in year t. The treatment 
indicator takes the value one for bins above £250k. Parameter β1 gives the 
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difference between the estimated empirical distribution and the counterfactual 
distribution in the absence of the notch. Function f is a polynomial of the upper 
bound of the bin. The shape of the polynomial is allowed to vary by year. The 
model includes dummies for bins close to the cut-off where bunching occurs. 
Based on visual examination of the distribution, controlling for six bins with 
upper bounds £240k, £245k, £250k, £255k, £260k and £265k seems sufficient 
for eliminating the effect of bunching on the shape of the estimated 
counterfactual distribution. We test for the robustness of the results to including 
dummies for more bins. Finally, the distribution clearly exhibits excessive mass 
at round values and dips after round values. To capture this pattern in the data, 
we include a dummy (Round50) for bins with round values divisible by £50k and 
a dummy for bins immediately after these round values.  
3.2.3 Results 
Table 8 shows the results of the effect of the tax on the sales volume. We use 3rd 
to 7th order polynomials of the price in different columns. In the upper panel we 
include dummies for six bins around the cut-off and in the lower panel we 
include eight dummies. The coefficient on the dummy for transactions above 
£250k is negative in all specifications. Based on the AIC statistic, 5th to 7th order 
polynomials seem sufficient. In these specifications the coefficient on the dummy 
for transactions above the cut-off is highly significant and indicates that the 2 
percentage point increase in the tax rate leads to roughly a 30 percent reduction 
in sales (a similar magnitude compared to that found in related studies – 
discussed in the introduction section – for other countries). This result is robust 
to including more bin dummies for groups close to the cut-off that are potentially 
affected by bunching.  
Figure 8 illustrates the fit of the model with a sixth order polynomial of house 
price and six bin dummies using one year of data (2006). The solid top line is the 
estimated counterfactual distribution in the absence of the tax rate increase and 
the solid bottom line is the estimated actual price distribution. The gap between 
the two lines is the effect of the tax rate increase on the sales volume. The saw-
tooth pattern at round values arises from controlling for bins divisible by £50k 
and bins after them. 
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FIGURE 8 
The effect of the stamp duty on transaction volume (2006 data) 
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4. Conclusions 
The previous literature suggests two main channels through which the stamp duty 
may have detrimental effects on the functioning of the economy. Firstly, by 
increasing moving costs, the stamp duty may deter the unemployed from taking 
up jobs far from their residence or workers from switching to more productive 
jobs. Secondly, the stamp duty can make households tolerate larger discrepancies 
between the characteristics of their actual and the desired dwelling before 
moving. As a result, the match between dwellings and households is on average 
worse than in the absence of the tax. The increased mismatch on the housing 
market may lead to ‘waste’ in the form of misallocation costs due to, for 
example, large households living in too small apartments and small households 
living in too large apartments simply because the stamp duty associated with 
moving outweighs the benefits of moving.  
The stamp duty induced increase in moving costs will only have these adverse 
effects if it actually reduces mobility. Our findings suggest that the stamp duty 
indeed decreases household mobility substantially; a 2 percentage-point increase 
in the stamp duty reduces household mobility by around 2 to 3 percentage points. 
This implies a reduction in mobility of around 30 percent. Our analysis of short- 
and longer-distance moves indicates that the effect is solely attributable to the 
stamp duty’s adverse impact on short-distance moves, which are typically related 
to adjustments in housing consumption. This implies that the stamp duty may 
lead predominately to misallocation of dwellings in the housing market. Its 
impact on the functioning of the labour market may be fairly limited.  
One interesting feature of the British housing market is the fact that owner-
occupier moves are comparably rare. During our sample period (2003 to 2007) 
and based on the full BHPS (not just our regression sample), the average 
propensity of a UK owner-occupier household to move during a calendar year 
was only 5.1 percent. This contrasts to the household mobility in the United 
States. Owner-occupier households in the US were more than twice as likely to 
move during our sample period: Based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) the propensity of US owner-occupier households to move during a 
calendar year was on average 11.5 percent. Both, UK and US owner-occupier 
households face housing transfer taxes, though in most US states and 
municipalities this tax is not very substantial. According to our results, 
differences in the transfer tax rates alone cannot explain this difference in 
mobility rates. In 2007 the average stamp duty rate faced by homeowners in the 
UK was 1.25% (based on the BHPS). A simple application of our preferred point 
estimates to all homeowners suggests that eliminating the stamp duty in the UK 
would increase mobility by 1.4 percentage-points to 6.5%, which is still much 
lower than the mobility rate for owner-occupiers in the US. 
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Given the magnitude of the negative effect of the stamp duty, particularly on 
short-distance and housing related mobility, we conclude that the stamp duty 
likely has very substantial detrimental effects on the functioning of the housing 
market. This implies that the stamp duty on residential properties is an inefficient 
way of collecting tax revenue. Taxes on land (and housing) consumption that 
apply independently of whether a household moves also have real property as the 
basis of taxation but are less distorting. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1 
Stamp duty schedule (during sample period) 
Purchase price Stamp duty rate 
Up to £125,000 0% 
Over £125,000 to £250,000 1% 
Over £250,000 to £500,000 3% 
Over £500,000 to £1 million 4% 
Over £1 million 5% 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary statistics (40 percent band around the £250k cut-off) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Self-assessed house value 17997 221.8 47.9 
Moved between t-1 and t 17997 0.047 0.211 
Moved less than 10 km 17997 0.026 0.160 
Moved 10 - 30 km 17997 0.008 0.087 
Moved over 30 km 17997 0.013 0.113 
Moved mainly for employment reasons 17997 0.003 0.052 
Moved mainly for housing or area reasons 17997 0.021 0.143 
Moved mainly for other or unknown reasons 17997 0.023 0.153 
Round house value (divisible with £50k) 17997 0.344 0.475 
Household has children 17997 0.340 0.474 
Annual household income 17528 37787 24681 
Age 17669 52.1 14.8 
GCE A-levels or higher 17149 0.645 0.478 
Bachelor degree or higher 17149 0.194 0.396 
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TABLE 3 
Stamp duty and mobility 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cut-off NO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.001 -0.02 -0.037** -0.055** -0.044 6665 
[0.007] [0.018] [0.018] [0.027] [0.028] 
-916 -916 -926 -927 -929 
30 % 0.006 -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.022** -0.029** 14151 
[0.004] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] 
-4742 -4764 -4762 -4764 -4763 
40 % 0.003 -0.011 -0.015* -0.029*** -0.024** 17997 
[0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011] 
  -4946 -4949 -4949 -4963 -4961 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Additional 
control variables: year dummies, dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at  
household level brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion shown 
in italics. 
 
TABLE 4 
Stamp duty and mobility – differential effects by distance of move 
Distance of move: Less than 10 kilometers 10 – 30 kilometers Over 30 kilometers 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 
20 % -0.057*** -0.048*** 0.013 0.013 -0.001 -0.002 
[0.018] [0.018] [0.011] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] 
-7559 -7564 -12317 -12317 -9186 -9186 
30 % -0.025*** -0.032*** 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.000 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] 
-19372 -19372 -30310 -30311 -22038 -22037 
40 % -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
  -23120 -23118 -36730 -36733 -27561 -27559 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Additional control 
variables: year dummies and dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level 
in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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TABLE 5 
Stamp duty and mobility – differential effects by primary reason of move 
Type of 
move: Employment reasons
Housing and area 
related reasons Other or unknown reasons
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 
20 % 0.01 0.009 -0.027 -0.015 -0.032* -0.03 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.018] 
-17833 -17832 -6356 -6365 -5139 -5137 
30 % 0.005 0.007 -0.019*** -0.009 -0.004 -0.023** 
[0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.009] 
-43659 -43660 -16181 -16182 -13735 -13742 
40 % 0.002 0.007* -0.020*** -0.017** -0.01 -0.01 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] 
  -55263 -55271 -19077 -19075 -16601 -16599 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Additional control 
variables: year dummies and dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level 
in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
 
TABLE 6 
Balance of covariates tests 
Panel A: 3rd order polynomial of house value   
Band around Age Kids (0/1) 
Ln(HH 
income) 
GCE A-levels 
or higher 
Bachelor 
or higher 
£250k cutoff       
30 % 0.66 -0.002 0.035 0.021 0.01 
[0.730] [0.025] [0.036] [0.025] [0.022] 
40 % 1.926*** -0.021 0.008 -0.006 -0.017 
  [0.658] [0.022] [0.032] [0.022] [0.020] 
Panel B: 4th order polynomial of house value   
Band around Age Kids (0/1) 
Ln(HH 
income) 
GCE A-levels 
or higher 
Bachelor 
or higher 
£250k cutoff     
30 % 0.589 0.038 0.028 0.041 0.043 
[0.979] [0.033] [0.050] [0.033] [0.029] 
40 % 0.442 0.016 0.034 0.017 0.018 
  [0.798] [0.027] [0.040] [0.027] [0.024] 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Additional control 
variables: year dummies, dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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TABLE 7 
Stamp duty and mobility – controls added 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cutoff NO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % 0.002 -0.025 -0.044** -0.075*** -0.061** 6263 
[0.007] [0.019] [0.019] [0.029] [0.029] 
-828 -829 -841 -843 -849 
30 % 0.005 -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.025** -0.032** 13310 
[0.004] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] 
-4414 -4432 -4430 -4431 -4429 
40 % 0.003 -0.01 -0.013 -0.027*** -0.026** 16983 
[0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011] 
  -4750 -4753 -4751 -4765 -4763 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Additional control 
variables: year dummies, dummy for round house value, age, dummy for kids, 18 region dummies, 
dummy for GCE A-levels or higher, dummy for bachelor degree or higher. Standard errors clustered at 
household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in 
italics. 
 
TABLE 8 
Effect of the stamp duty on transaction volume 
Dependent variable: ln(Number of transactions in bin) 
  Order of polynomial of house value   
  3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
Price>£250k -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.287*** -0.287*** -0.315***
[0.044] [0.045] [0.070] [0.071] [0.109] 
-504.6 -505.4 -512.7 -514.3 -515.7 
6 bin dummies £240k-
£265k Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Price>£250k -0.097 -0.097* -0.282*** -0.282*** -0.331** 
[0.063] [0.055] [0.094] [0.092] [0.164] 
-504.5 -510.9 -516.7 -519.5 -520.9 
8 bin dummies £235k-
£270k Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house price>$250k). Polynomial of house 
price is allowed to vary by year. Additional control variables: year dummies, dummies for round house 
price and price after round values. Robust standard errors in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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Appendix Tables 
TABLE A1 
Stamp duty and mobility – households reporting a  
self-assessed house value of £250,000 dropped 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cut-off NO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.001 -0.02 -0.038** -0.056** -0.045 4706 
[0.007] [0.018] [0.018] [0.027] [0.028]  
-204 -203 -213 -213 -215  
30 % 0.009** -0.025** -0.027** -0.008 -0.014 12192 
[0.004] [0.011] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016]  
-3947 -3960 -3958 -3961 -3962  
40 % 0.006 -0.002 -0.007 -0.035*** -0.031** 16038 
[0.004] [0.009] [0.010] [0.013] [0.014]  
  -4163 -4162 -4161 -4173 -4172  
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Households 
reporting self-assessed house values of £250,000 were dropped. Additional control variables: year 
dummies, dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level brackets. * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion shown in italics. 
 
TABLE A2 
Stamp duty and mobility – sample includes only households saying they would like to 
move 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cut-off NO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % 0.001 -0.05 -0.071 -0.111 -0.111 1409 
[0.023] [0.055] [0.058] [0.082] [0.082] 
1059 1059 1060 1062 1062 
30 % 0.014 -0.081*** -0.086** -0.080** -0.053 2808 
[0.015] [0.027] [0.036] [0.037] [0.045] 
1619 1602 1604 1605 1604 
40 % 0.018 -0.046* -0.071** -0.106*** -0.062 3774 
[0.014] [0.024] [0.029] [0.032] [0.041] 
  2280 2271 2271 2266 2262 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Sample includes 
only households saying they are willing to move. Additional control variables: year dummies, dummy for 
round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Akaike Information Criterion shown in italics. 
 34 
 
TABLE A3 
Stamp duty and mobility – coefficients on nth order polynomials  
allowed to vary on different sides of cut-off 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 1st 2nd 
20 % -0.035* -0.049 
[0.018] [0.035] 
-922 -928 
30 % -0.030*** -0.027 
[0.011] [0.017] 
-4762 -4759 
40 % -0.011 -0.041*** 
[0.009] [0.014] 
  -4948 -4957 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house 
value>£250k). Additional control variables: year dummies and dummy for round 
house value. Standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
 
TABLE A4 
Placebo tests with artificial cut-offs 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Artificial 
Order of polynomial of  
house value  
cut-off 3rd 4th N 
£200k -0.012 0.000 15688 
[0.016] [0.017] 
£225k -0.003 0.006 14578 
[0.011] [0.012] 
£275k 0.013 0.011 12149 
[0.013] [0.013] 
£300k 0.005 0.039* 9409 
  [0.013] [0.022] 
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the placebo treatment indicator. 
Additional control variables: year dummies, dummy for round house value. 
Sample: +/- 30 percent band around the artificial cut-off. Standard errors 
clustered at household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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TABLE A5 
Stamp duty and mobility – two-way clustering at house value group level and household 
level 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band 
around 
Order of polynomial of house value (rounded up to closest 
£5,000)   
£250k 
cutoff NO 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
40 % 0.003 -0.012 -0.016* -0.028*** -0.026** 17997
[0.005] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.013]  
  -4946 -4951 -4950 -4961 -4960  
Notes: The table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>£250k). Additional control 
variables: year dummies and dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at house value 
group level (£5,000 groups) and household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike 
Information Criterion is shown in italics.
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